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Catch 22 says they have a right to do 
anything we can't stop them from 
doing.1 
 





The Good … has no universal form, 
regardless of the subject matter or 
situation: sound moral judgement 
always respects the detailed 
circumstances of specific kinds of cases.2 
 
Aristotle,  




Phronetic social science is dialogical in 
the sense that it incorporates, and, if 
successful, itself is incorporated into, a 
polyphony of voices, with no one voice, 
including that of the researcher, 
claiming final authority.3 
 
Bent Flyvbjerg,  
Making Social Science Matter  
                                                        
1 Heller, Joseph, Catch 22 (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011), p. 407 
2 Aristotle, cited by Toulmin, Stephen, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 31-32 
3 Flyvbjerg, Bent, Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed 





The intervention dilemma, initially articulated by Hedley Bull and commonly 
conceived as the key dispute between pluralist and solidarist proponents of the 
English School of International Relations, has gradually become one of the 
central dilemmas in the context of tackling human suffering. Roughly defined as 
a stalemate between doing something through intervention (which inevitably 
tramples the norm of non-intervention) and doing nothing (which entails moral 
indifference and possibly ‘dirty hands’ through idly standing by), this 
dissertation broaches two distinct strands of Liberal Peace critique as 
expressions of each position of the aforementioned juxtaposition. Relating this 
debate between Roland Paris and David Chandler to the cosmopolitan-
communitarian divide, the intervention dilemma will be defined as a Catch 22, in 
which opting for one choice makes the other one seem more eligible. The only 
way to overcome this entrenched debate is by letting go of these foundationalist 
views on morality. Following Oliver P. Richmond’s assertion that sustainable 
peace can only be reached through dialogue that takes the everyday context as 
its designated starting point, the Linklaterian notion of dialogical politics will be 
defined as a crucial element of overcoming the intervention dilemma. Finally, 
this can only be achieved through a so-called phronetic approach that elects 
practical judgements in favour of theoretical frameworks. The conclusion is then 
drawn that if we want to assess the necessity of intervening or not in the case of 
human suffering and therefore make practical judgements that matter, the 
notion of power has to be taken into account by asking questions of the power 
relations among the parties involved, including the researcher, and of who wins 
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It was an engagement with the Democratic Peace theory, while studying 
International Relations at the University of Antwerp in 2010, which laid the 
foundations for thinking about the notion of intervention. Under the conspicuous 
title The Dialectics of the Democratic Peace, my dissertation at the time asserted 
that this theoretical framework shows risks of becoming a justification for 
interventionist policies. Largely inspired by Democratic Wars: Looking at the 
Dark Side of the Democratic Peace,4 I based this assertion on the absence of 
critical engagement with these justifications in liberal foreign policies regardless 
of the flawed logic that underpins the Democratic Peace theory. 
 With radical criticism towards any form of intervention justification as a 
foundation, I became inspired to challenge my own convictions by Huw 
Williams’s teachings on international justice at Aberystwyth University. 
Discarding intervention too swiftly could inhibit any prospect of tackling issues 
of injustice and thereby ending human suffering. Throughout an engagement 
with his book On Rawls, Development and Global Justice: The Freedom Of Peoples,5 
I was lead into a new way of thinking about the issue of intervention that 
exposed the limitations of my previous assertions. Subsequently, it was this book 
that provided me with a perspicuous articulation of the intervention dilemma 
and its formulation as a Catch 22. This acknowledgement section is therefore 
mainly included to express my gratitude and recognition for Williams’s patient 
                                                        
4 Geis, Anna, Brock, Lothar, and Müller, Harald (eds.), Democratic Wars: Looking at the Dark Side 
of the Democratic Peace (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006) 
5 Williams, Huw Lloyd, On Rawls, Development and Global Justice. The Freedom of Peoples 
(Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) 
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and encouraging support throughout the process of writing this dissertation. 
Without his contribution, this work would not have reached its present 
condition. It goes without saying that I nonetheless take full responsibility for 
what it eventually turned into. 
 Additionally, I wish to thank Joannes Truyens and Aaron McKeil for their 
insightful and helpful reviews, and Suzanne Klein Schaarsberg and Andreas 
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An Old Question Asked Anew 
 
If a right of intervention is proclaimed for the purpose of enforcing standards of 
conduct, and yet no consensus exists in the international community governing 
its use, then the door is open to intervention by particular states using such right 
as a pretext, and the principle of territorial sovereignty is placed in jeopardy.6 
 
Initially published as a paper given to the British Committee on the Theory of 
International Politics in 1962, The Grotian Conception of International Society is 
known to be Hedley Bull’s effort to flesh out a theory of International Society that 
incorporated pluralist and solidarist strands of thought. The so-called English 
School of International Relations contends that sovereign states form an 
International Society. This has induced its proponents to either value the order 
among the multiple communities in this society (pluralist) or explore the 
prospects of wielding justice to promote high standards of behaviour within 
these communities (solidarist).7 This distinction, although seemingly innocuous, 
essentially embodies a persistent tension that has far exceeded the boundaries of 
the English School. Applied to the question of the legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention, the pluralist-solidarist divide can be translated into the 
contraposition between the prevailing norm of non-intervention and the issue of 
armed intervention in the case of human suffering. According to Nick Wheeler, 
humanitarian intervention therefore “poses the conflict between order and 
justice in its starkest form.”8  
                                                        
6 Bull, Hedley, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Butterfield, Herbert and 
Wight, Martin (eds.) Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 71  
7  Suganami, Hidemi, ‘The English School in a Nutshell’, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of 
International Studies, vol. 9 (2010), pp. 15-28 
8 Wheeler, Nicholas J., ‘Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and 
Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, vol. 21 
(1992), p. 463 
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In his later work however, Bull abandoned his pluralist assertions and 
adumbrated a more solidarist theory of international society in which he 
explored the reach of justice beyond the borders in International Society.9 Be 
that as it may, this solidarism of the will is fundamentally challenged by the 
pluralism of the intellect that exposes the former as “cosmopolitan solidarism”10 
by asserting that there are multiple concepts of justice. Implementing a 
particular notion of justice therefore severely threatens to erode the norm of 
non-intervention and affecting coexistence and order in International Society. In 
other words, the central hitch is that there is insufficient consensus on what 
justice is and what level of human suffering would justify intervention. Until 
then: “the cure may well be worse than the disease.”11 Not before consensus on a 
universal concept of justice is reached, any particular concept of justice with 
universal aspirations might provoke dangerous outcomes. 
 Although Hidemi Suganami might be right in asserting that “most English 
School thinkers are solidarists at heart”12, this does not resolve the underlying 
tension between intervening to end human suffering and not intervening 
because action might do more harm than inaction. On what grounds can one 
defend the pluralist norm of non-intervention? Or as Chris Brown states, “if 
diversity entails that states have the right to mistreat their populations, then it is 
difficult to see why such diversity should be valued.”13 The issue is even knottier 
when the international system itself is held to be the producer of injustice. For 
                                                        
9 Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Dunne, Tim, ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of 
the Will’, International Affairs, vol. 72 (1996), pp. 91-107 
10 Wheeler & Dunne, Pluralism and Solidarism, p. 98 
11 Wheeler, Bull & Vincent, p. 487 
12 Suganami, The English School, p. 26 
13 Brown, Chris, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1992), p. 125 
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instance, in the present economical order, doing nothing has a considerable price 
tag. Consequently, this tension has gradually evolved into a dilemma or Catch 22 
between doing something and doing nothing in which no option is entirely 
satisfying. 
 
'Doing something' to rescue non-citizens facing the extreme is likely to provoke 
the charge of interference in the internal affairs of another state, while 'doing 
nothing' can lead to accusations of moral indifference.14 
 
This dissertation will address the old question on intervention anew. Rather than 
follow the framework of the English School, the argument will take the Liberal 
Peace thesis as its starting point. The reason for this decision is twofold. Firstly, 
although it was arguably the English School who originally articulated and 
theorised the intervention dilemma, this did not result in a viable framework for 
assessing issues of intervention. Even Wheeler’s Saving Strangers: Humanitarian 
Intervention in International Society leaves the reader behind with an idealistic 
hope for a solidarist world to come as a compensation for a provisional resort to 
pluralism.15 Secondly, rather than audaciously discarding the English School as 
an outdated and feckless enterprise, the argument will be made that during the 
last two decades, the Liberal Peace thesis has gained considerable support as a 
framework for assessing emerging issues like humanitarian intervention. The 
key question then is: Why start this introduction with a consideration of the 
pluralist-solidarist divide? The main reason for this is the resonance of Bull’s 
solidarism of the will in the cosmopolitan aspiration to end human suffering. 
They both inevitably thrust upon the tension Wheeler articulated so pertinently. 
                                                        
14 Wheeler, Nicholas J., Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 1 
15 Suganami, The English School, p. 26 
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Although a reference to the English School will be made occasionally, it will not 
constitute the central topic of engagement because of the abovementioned 
reasons. Whereas the English School’s articulation of this dilemma has to be kept 
in mind, the emergence of it in the Liberal Peace thesis is what moved this 
dissertation and is therefore taken to be its starting point. 
The persistence of this thesis and more importantly, its failed translation 
into policy, has in itself sparked notable strands of criticism. Two distinct 
answers to the question of the implied intervention within this framework will 
constitute the outset of this dissertation. Cautioning moral indifference and a 
continuation of human suffering, Roland Paris holds that we are to critically 
engage with the Liberal Peace thesis and modify it in order to preserve its 
advantageous elements. Subsequently, the dilemma is initiated by opening up to 
David Chandler’s objection to the uncritical stance towards intervention that 
Paris’s argument entails. In order to clarify this juxtaposition more thoroughly, 
the second part of this dissertation will relate these positions to one of the most 
fundamental divides in political theory, namely between cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism. 16  By delving into the core aspects and contemporary 
proponents of both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, the question of 
whether there is any prospect of bridging the gap between these two positions 
will be addressed. After engaging with John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples,17 the 
second part will conclude that this work arrived at one of the boldest 
formulations of the intervention dilemma that bears little prospect for a 
prosperous outcome.  
                                                        
16 Although one could have included the English School’s dichotomy between solidarism and 
pluralism since this is another variation of the aforementioned divide, this argument will not be 
made here. 
17 Rawls, John, The Law Of Peoples (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1999) 
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In the third part, the argument will therefore retrace its steps by 
exploring a different tradition within both the Liberal Peace thesis and 
cosmopolitan thought that seeks to transcend the ever-lurking stalemate by 
placing dialogical politics and the everyday context at its core. Eventually, this 
will probe the question of what the implications and prospects are for aspiring 
and constructing theoretical frameworks on intervention. By broaching the work 
of Chris Brown and Bent Flyvbjerg, the argument will be made that, rather than 
the application of abstract blueprints, we have to consider making practical 
judgements, steeped in the Aristotelian notion of Phronesis, that take into 
account the key aspects of dialogical politics and include the voice of the 
researcher in a polyphony of voices. Additionally, the critique of opening the 
door to anything-goes judgements will be contested by taking the notion of 
power into account. By asking questions about power, like for instance who 
gains and who loses when an intervention is waged or not, a resort to arbitrary 
and inconsistent judgements is circumvented and issues of intervention can be 





The Intervention Dilemma in 
The Liberal Peace Thesis 
 
Ever since the end of the Cold War, the so-called Liberal Peace thesis has 
received much attention from both an academic perspective through the work of 
various International Relations (IR) scholars, and from more field-oriented 
perspectives. What was specifically intriguing about this thesis was its 
applicability to policy issues like humanitarian intervention, which is why it is 
asserted in this dissertation. The first part of this dissertation will provide a 
detailed analysis of the Liberal Peace debate as an articulation of the 
intervention dilemma by placing two notable strands of criticism to the fore. 
Briefly summarised, the Liberal Peace thesis is based on the conviction 
that “democracy, the rule of law and market economics would create sustainable 
peace in post-conflict and transitional states and societies.”18 This consensus is 
grounded on more quantitative research like for instance Bruce Russett’s 
Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World,19 in which 
the author provides a notable amount of data to support the assertion that 
democracies are not likely to wage war with one another. This in turn increases 
                                                        
18 Campbell, Susanna, Chandler, David, and Sabaratnam, Meera (eds.), A Liberal Peace? The 
Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding (London, Zed Books Limited, 2011), p. 1 
19 Russet, Bruce, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1993) 
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the prospects that the application of this framework on post-conflict societies 
would create sustainable peace. More importantly, it has strengthened the 
assertion that the Liberal Peace thesis can justify certain interventions. 
However, throughout the events that found their justification in this 
assertion, it became obvious that the equation democracy = peace is rather 
simplistic and a little too optimistic.20 After repeated failure of implementing the 
Liberal Peace framework throughout the peace operations of the 1990’s, debate 
has emerged that questions its value and validity.21 Although Campbell, Chandler, 
and Sabaratnam hold that confining this debate between “critical voices” (those 
who critically engage the issue of peace through intervention) and “problem 
solvers” (those who wish to modify or improve the Liberal Peace framework) is 
an “unhelpful dichotomy”22, I would still argue that, if we relate this debate to the 
topic of intervention, it defines this issue from a perspective of clarity. It is only 
within this purpose that this division is to be situated for it is not my intention to 
entrench or juxtapose this debate too radically. I want to stress that this division 
is arbitrary outside the framework of this dissertation. 
 
 
1. 1. Saving Liberal Peacebuilding? 
 
One might wonder if there are considerable alternatives to the Liberal Peace 
framework that successfully address the pressing issues which call for our 
                                                        
20 Rasler, Karen and Thompson, William R., Puzzles of the Democratic Peace: Theory, Geopolitics 
and the Transformation of World Politics (Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) 
21 Campbell et al, A Liberal Peace?, p. 1 
22 Ibid, p. 1 
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attention on the one hand, without lapsing in a simplified perspective of this 
framework on the other hand. Arguing that such alternatives do not exist, Roland 
Paris claims we have no options but to modify the Liberal Peace thesis and 
consequently save liberal peacebuilding.23 This is caused by a motivation to 
tackle these issues more effectively but inevitably entails a less critical 
perspective on intervening. 
Paris starts his argument by referring to UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, who in 1992 wrote an Agenda for Peace,24 widely seen as the 
founding framework for what came to be know as post-conflict peacebuilding: 
action “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”25 In the same decade, 
fourteen peacebuilding operations were deployed in regions that recently had 
experienced civil war. Although engagement with the foundational assumptions 
of this policy is remarkably absent in the major body of literature, these missions 
were nonetheless guided by a widely accepted theory: 
 
The notion that promoting “liberalization” in countries that recently experienced 
civil war would help to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace. In the 
political realm, liberalization means democratization, or the promotion of periodic 
and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental 
power, and respect for basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, 
and conscience.26 
 
This promotion of liberalisation or Liberal Peace agenda shows some remarkable 
flaws when we look at the track record of peacebuilding missions after the Cold 
War. Paris concludes that these policies not only failed “to produce stable and 
                                                        
23 Paris, Roland, ‘Saving liberal peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies, vol. 36 (2010), pp. 
337-365 
24 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping (New York, United Nations, 1992) 
25 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 11 
26 Paris, At War’s End, p. 5 
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lasting peace in most of the countries that hosted the missions,”27 they were also 
founded on the overly optimistic belief that liberalisation had pacifying effects on 
post-conflict societies. In short, the liberalisation process exacerbated rather 
than moderated these conflicts.28 
Highlighting the problems of the Liberal Peace thesis itself, Paris accedes to 
the same group of scholars that started to question and criticise this thesis and 
its policy implications. Within this group however, he noted that the pendulum of 
criticism has occasionally been swinging “past the point of justified questioning 
and, in some quarters, now verges on unfounded scepticism and even 
cynicism.”29 Fearing a radical rejection of the peacebuilding enterprise as a whole 
and a refuge in inaction that it inevitably entails, Paris aims to look for what he 
defines as “alternatives within liberal peacebuilding”30 that do not blindly defend 
the current international practices. Largely influenced by high profile failures of 
intervention, these hypercritics, according to Paris, argue to have exposed 
peacebuilding as “a form of Western or liberal imperialism.”31 Critics like David 
Chandler (among others) radically claim that “liberal peacebuilding was hiding a 
deeper and more destructive purpose: imperial or quasi-imperial domination.”32 
Swapping sound criticism for radical cynicism, which objects any form of 
intervention, the causes of harm are left unaffected. 
Paris’s enterprise is ambitious yet subtle: on the one hand, he 
acknowledges the shortcomings of the prevailing Liberal Peace framework, 
while on the other hand, he intends to modify or improve this framework instead 
                                                        
27 Ibid, p. 175 
28 Ibid, p. 176 
29 Paris, Saving Liberal Peacebuilding, p. 338 
30 Ibid, p. 339 
31 Ibid, p. 344 
32 Ibid, p. 345 
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of lapsing into hyper-critical theorising. In that regard, it is important to 
disentangle the many flawed understandings that a failure to differentiate 
between different forms of liberal intervention generates. Paris lists five 
recurring mistakes.33 In short, he urges not to confuse intervention with invasion, 
to hold the echoes of colonialism for mere equivalence, and to take into 
consideration both the positive outcomes of intervening as the negative 
consequences when refraining from doing so. Especially the risk of getting ‘dirty 
hands’ by doing nothing is not negligible in the context of the intervention 
dilemma. 
Constrained by a lack of a “realistic or preferable alternative” to the 
liberal peacebuilding framework, we have to “reform existing approaches within 
a broadly liberal framework.”34 To get an idea of what this might imply, Paris 
reverts to classical liberal theorists, like for instance Kant and Locke.35 Contrary 
to contemporary liberal theorists, they provided the Liberal Peace thesis with a 
foundational framework for properly functioning state institutions. In a reaction 
to Hobbes’s Leviathan,36 they sought to transform this central authority into an 
“effective and limited government.”37 Although they opposed Hobbes’s all-
powerful monster that completely stood above society, they nonetheless 
recognised the necessity of a central authority to uphold the rule of law and 
protect its society from foreign and domestic threats. Put differently, they “did 
not dispense with the Leviathan. They tamed it.”38  
                                                        
33 Ibid, pp. 347-354 
34 Paris, Saving Liberal Peacebuilding, p. 362 
35 Paris, Roland, ‘Bringing the Leviathan Back In: Classical versus Contemporary Studies of the 
Liberal Peace’, International Studies Review, vol. 8 (2006), pp. 425-440 
36 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968) 
37 Paris, Bringing the Leviathan Back In, p. 427 
38 Ibid, p. 427 
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Whereas these classical theorists saw functioning state institutions as a 
precondition for peace, contemporary theorists tend to take the state and its 
proper functioning institutions for granted. This institutional framework is 
necessary however, for it acts as the most effective guardian against any attempt 
to defy the principles of liberalisation. Paris’s alternative is therefore 
Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation (IBL). Building sustainable state 
institutions should precede typical liberal reforms like democratic elections and 
market-oriented reforms. Furthermore, these implementations should be 
introduced incrementally; making it less attractive but more effective that the 
‘quick and dirty’ approach of plain liberalisation. IBL does not reject the goals of 
liberalisation but seeks to reach them through different, more effective means. 
Its main argument is that, in post-conflict societies, stability through 
institutionalisation is more important than implementing political and economic 
freedom.39 This approach consists of six steps that all have to be met before 
liberalisation can be introduced.40 Summarised, they call for the establishing of 
moderate political parties, the introduction of election rules that encourage 
moderation, the development of a civil society, the regulation of hate speech, the 
promotion of economic reforms that moderate social tension, and the 
development of a neutral bureaucracy. 
Eventually, Paris defends this approach from potential critics by stressing 
the absence of realistic alternatives. More so, he considers it to be impossible to 
come up with alternatives that work outside the liberal framework. We should 
therefore seek to modify and improve the existing liberal framework to 
                                                        
39 Paris, At War’s End, p. 187 
40 Ibid, pp. 188-207 
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peacebuilding instead of trying to transcend it or completely reject the whole 
peacebuilding enterprise. This argument will foster critical reactions, most 
notably from David Chandler, who argues that most Liberal Peace critics are 
profoundly uncritical of the notion of intervention. 
 
 
1. 2. The Uncritical Critique of Liberal Peace 
 
Assessing Paris’ IBL framework, Chandler heckles the dogmatic acceptance of the 
underlying assumptions of an approach that heavily relies on the primacy of 
institutionalisation and external regulation. “The assumption is that the 
problems of politics can be resolved outside the realm of the political, in the 
realms of law, social policy, and administration.”41 By externally managing non-
Western states through the postponement of liberalisation – “i.e. opening up the 
political process to democratic competition”42 – this process can be defined, 
Chandler argues, as “peace without politics.”43  
Moreover, these policies have quite ironic outcomes because, on the one 
hand, they want to “prevent (non-Western) state sovereignty from giving 
impunity to tyrants and human rights-abusing governments” while on the other 
hand, (Western) “states have acquired much greater sovereign powers to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of the other states.” 44  Inevitably, this 
                                                        
41 Chandler, David, Empire In Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London, Pluto Press, 2006), p. 
56 
42 Chandler, Empire In Denial, p. 56 
43 Ibid, p. 56 
44 Chandler, David, ‘Back to the future? The limits of neo-Wilsonian ideals of exporting 
democracy’, Review of International Studies, vol. 32 (2006), p. 489 
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reintroduces a “return to the pre-UN era of Westphalian ‘might makes right’.”45 
Implied here is the peacebuilder’s rejection of the domestic political sphere as an 
independent and constitutive sphere in favour of international institutions that 
pretend to transcend state interests. This claim is strengthened by the recent 
shift of attention to “new ‘human security’ doctrines where the focus is no longer 
on the defence of states but upon the rights of individuals wherever they might 
be in the world.”46 In From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International 
Intervention,47 Chandler stresses the limited critique of this radical shift towards 
human rights-based interventionism. 
Even so, this shift gradually transformed into a framework that came to 
be known as The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)48, in which the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty claims they have constructed 
a perspective based on morality as opposed to power or realpolitik.49 They 
unambiguously subscribe to the shift towards human security by arguing “that 
individual human rights ‘trump’ the rights of sovereignty”50 What is most 
noteworthy about this argument is that, by establishing a language of 
“sovereignty as responsibility”51, it seeks to bridge the divide between state 
sovereignty and intervention as it was established in the post-1945 political 
framework.  
                                                        
45 Chandler, Back to the future, p. 489 
46 Ibid, p. 488 
47 Chandler, David, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London, 
Pluto Press, 2002) 
48 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: 
Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa, Inter- national Development Research Centre, 
2001), pp.129–138 
49 Chandler, David, ‘The Responsibility to protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’’, International 
Peacekeeping, vol. 11 (2004), p. 62 
50 Chandler, The Responsibility to protect, p. 64 
51 R2P, p. 136 
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Instead of providing a clear and legally embedded framework placed 
under UN authority, Chandler argues, “the end product can only be vague and 
ambitious ‘ethical checklists’ that can easily be used to further erode the need 
for UN authorization.”52 Eventually, the commission came up with a list of six 
criteria that have to be satisfied in order to justify military intervention: “just 
cause, right intention, right authority, last resort, proportional means, and 
reasonable prospect.”53 The strong resemblance with a similar checklist from the 
tradition of Just War theory should not be dismissed as mere coincidence. 
The heart of the problem, according to Chandler, is that this morally 
constituted justification of intervention is dangerously susceptible of being 
hijacked by less ethical agendas. “It would appear that the advocates of the 
Liberal Peace do not have a monopoly on the morality of putting needs of victims 
first.”54 Chandler clarifies this statement by referring to the agenda of the Bush 
administration, which used moral universalism to justify an agenda based on U.S. 
power and realpolitik after 11 September 2001.55 When juridical and political 
frameworks are failing, the “morally-based ideas of the ‘liberal peace’”56 could 
step in as justifications of interventionism. Furthermore, the commission’s 
assumption that ‘right makes might’ is in this context little different from the 
notion of ‘might makes right’ that constitutes realpolitik.57 
Applied to a more radical critique of the Liberal Peace thesis, the 
underlying assumptions of this thesis, that have now found their way into 
mainstream political consensus like the R2P framework on intervention, can 
                                                        
52 Ibid, p. 69 
53 Ibid, p. 69 
54 Chandler, The Responsibility to protect, p. 73 
55 Ibid, p. 73 
56 Ibid, p. 75 
57 Ibid, p. 76 
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easily be used for quite different agendas. This should be of considerable 
importance when assessing claims to intervene or not. But Chandler goes even 
further and this is where his critique of the Liberal Peace thesis is articulated in 
its boldest form. Let us start from the common assertion among most Liberal 
Peace critics that this thesis uncritically accepts the universalisation of Western 
liberal frameworks. These scholars started to engage this assumption when 
international peacekeeping interventions in the 1990’s did not seem to reap the 
expected success. What they took to be the central problem of these policies is 
the tendency to impose the agenda of “the reconstruction of ‘Westphalian’ 
frameworks of state sovereignty; the liberal framework of individual rights and 
winner-takes all-elections; and neoliberal free market economic programmes.”58 
But this is not the key issue. More problematic is that they have moved from 
analysing the notion of intervention to the framework of liberalism that 
constitutes the implementation of this notion.59 What is absent in these forms of 
critical engagement is a “critical validation of the intervener’s own fictions, in 
which they are agents of a liberal world order.”60 The prevailing argument is that 
the policies of liberal peacebuilding are mostly too liberal and should therefore 
be modified. More conservative critiques of liberalism, like Paris’s, are “not a 
critique of interventionist policy-making but rather a defence of current 
practices on the basis that they have not been properly applied or understood.“61 
That is why they focus so heavily on institutional reform as a more effective way 
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of implementing this liberal agenda and reaching the goals of liberalisation by 
more efficient means. 
Chandler exposes the critique that liberal peacebuilding is too liberal as “a 
self-serving and fictional policy narrative.”62 There is an undeniable tendency to 
frame the problem of intervention as a problem of the dichotomous relationship 
between the liberal self and the non-liberal other. The failure of implementing 
liberal policies in non-liberal societies because these policies are too liberal 
strongly implies the irreconcilability of both frameworks and so paints the non-
liberal other as a barrier to peace. What might be added is that the presumption, 
“that markets and democracy could not work without external institutional 
intervention”63 actually fosters the pessimistic attitude towards the capabilities 
of the non-liberal other. 
On a more fundamental level, this argument seems to be undermining 
liberalism from within. Overly focussing on institutional reforms, eventually 
leads to negligence of the original idea of liberating a society. 
 
The focus on institutional solutions … to the problems of conflict and transition 
is indicative of the narrowing down of aspirations from transforming society to 
merely regulating or managing it …. This is a long way from the promise of 
liberal transformation and the discourse of ‘liberating’ societies economically and 
politically.64 
 
By promoting an institutional agenda of external regulation, reform, and 
governance over a classic agenda of liberalisation, democratisation, and free 
market economics because it is too liberal, policymakers have not only severely 
lowered their expectations of the non-liberal other, who is helpless “unless 
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tutored by international experts”65; more importantly, they have abandoned any 
hope or prospect of building a “liberal international order.”66 Rather than an 
order that benefits the interest of the West, this order, according to liberal 
theory, is one that promotes and protects each state’s right of sovereignty and 
autonomy. Instead of a so-called Westphalian State, the policies of intervention 
have in doing so reproduced a state that is “increasingly reduced to an 
administrative level, in which sovereignty no longer marks a clear boundary line 
between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.”67 This has lead liberal peacebuilders a long way 
from their initial goals: by focusing on institutional capacity building rather than 
promoting democracy and development, the likelihood of creating a peaceful 
liberal world order is profoundly decreased. Because the non-liberal other is 
declared to be irreconcilable with liberal norms and values, the argument is 
made that there is “a need for greater international engagement in the state 
institutions”68 that eventually will enable the introduction of these norms and 
values although they, ironically, are held to be exceeding realistic expectations. 
Chandler notes the absence of critical alternatives to the prevailing policies 
of liberal intervention and peacebuilding. This is caused by an emphasis on the 
flaws of liberalism instead of a critical engagement with the notion of 
interventionism itself. More so, these interventions are not necessarily liberal 
universalist but rather “mechanisms of control and ordering.”69 In summary, 
critiques of the Liberal Peace, like Paris’s IBL, are profoundly uncritical when it 
comes to the assumption of intervention. In addition, emphasising on 
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institutionalisation instead of liberalisation, these policies no longer intend to 
create a Liberal Peace and so create externally regulated societies, incapable of 
self-determination and irreconcilable with liberal norms and values. This 
shatters the liberalisation project from within. 
At its most basic level, Chandler’s critique assesses the underlying 
consequences of not only the Liberal Peace thesis, but most of its critics as well. 
By reverting to the widely accepted shift towards human-centred approaches 
within both academic scholarship and field-oriented policies, he eventually 
exposes the erosion of the Westphalian system of states as the most severe 
implication of his adversaries’ uncritical stance. Rather than defend a 
conservative preservation of this system and the defence of its problematic 
consequences, he points to the arbitrary deconstruction of post-1945 rights of 
non-intervention and state sovereignty that is entailed in this cosmopolitan 
turn.70 The notion of an upcoming framework of individual rights challenging the 
prevailing framework of sovereign rights is one of the central assumptions of 
cosmopolitan thought. The problem with this approach however, is that this 
assertion has a utopian undertone, for “there is more attention to the ethical 
ends of cosmopolitan democracy than there is to the mechanisms and means of 
ensuring these.”71 The individual rights thereby risk becoming fictitious and 
separate the rights from their subject . The problem is that such rights without 
subject tend to challenge the existing rights, like those for sovereign autonomy, 
non-intervention, and self-government.72 In the case of liberal peacebuilding, 
these rights are undermined by the concept of sovereign inequality, although 
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according to international law, non-liberal states benefit from the same 
legitimacy and international rights as their liberal counterparts.73 
To justify this argument, Chandler argues that cosmopolitan liberals tend 
to undermine democratic norms by regarding decisions based on the majority of 
the population as “not necessarily the final arbiter of democracy.”74 Once again, 
this agenda of liberal imposition undermines its own goals and, like the 
institutional critics of the Liberal Peace thesis, these cosmopolitan liberals tend 
to be moving “above the sphere of democracy.”75 Chandler once more invokes the 
absence of an alternative, this time defining it as the central problem of the 
cosmopolitan argument: on the one hand, the moral justification of the state 
system is challenged as it naturally encourages human suffering, though on the 
other hand, no valuable alternative is presented, setting up a “scenario where 
intervention is the prerogative of the powerful against the weak.”76 Chandler 
concludes we are once again presented with a case of might makes right. The 
lack of a universal juridical framework enables the powerful to determine when 
intervention is justified or not. 
 
 
1. 3. Throwing the Baby Out With the Bathwater? 
 
While remaining loyal to both these authors’ respective arguments, the aim of 
this chapter was to put forward two differing approaches to the Liberal Peace 
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thesis. Even so, there are some important similarities worth considering, 
especially if one is to prevent any polarised entrenchment of this debate. Namely, 
both Paris and Chandler consider themselves critics of the Liberal Peace thesis. 
This is partially a matter of degree, as Paris opposes Chandler’s radical criticism 
whereas the latter might argue that the former’s argument is profoundly 
uncritical when it comes to intervention. However, they nonetheless wish to 
undo or assess the unfortunate consequences of Liberal Peace practices. 
Ironically, they both stress the absence of an alternative approach. The key 
question, of course, is alternative to what? Paris on the one hand seriously 
doubts any possibility of working outside the existing liberal framework and 
therefore seeks to improve that framework rather than transcend it. Chandler on 
the other hand, seems to be excluding the likelihood of transcending the 
international system of sovereign states. More so, he criticises the undermining 
challenge that cosmopolitan thought poses to this order, as it will deprive 
weaker states from the rights they inherently posses in the contemporary 
international order. 
Paris is most likely aware of the necessity of improving what can be done 
about pressing world issues. He urges us not to engage the existing framework 
too radically, for we might risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater. The 
absence of an alternative might not be a coincidence so we should put all our 
efforts in improving the framework we have. This whole endeavour, according to 
Chandler, not only seems to be undermining its own assumptions, but its long-
term consequences are yet to be evaluated. What remains after Chandler’s 
sweeping criticism is the question of how we can engage these issues. How can 
we possibly address the issues that are at stake without lapsing into the flaws of 
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the Liberal Peace framework? In order to address this question in detail, it is 
essential to look at the deeper voices that seem to be lurking in this debate. 
Chandler’s reference to cosmopolitanism opens up an underlying debate about 
the moral value of state borders and the question of how they can justify 
structural abuse of human rights. In the next chapter, the transition will 
therefore be made to the more fundamental debate between cosmopolitanism 





The Catch 22 in  
The Cosmopolitan-Communitarian Debate 
 
This dissertation began with the observation that there seems to be a perpetual 
dilemma when it comes to the question of intervening or not. This dilemma 
precludes us from choosing between two opposing options. On the one hand, the 
option is to engage with pressing issues such as conflict and injustice by 
intervening in other societies and so inevitably trample norms of sovereignty 
and non-intervention. On the other hand, clinging to these norms too heavily not 
only exposes moral indifference to the issues at hand, it also questions the moral 
value of the boundaries; which is the essential point of debate between the two 
above-mentioned groups. In order to reach a better and more thorough 
understanding of this apparent juxtaposition, it has to be related to the debate 
between cosmopolitans and communitarians in political theory. Additionally, 
highlighting the main characteristics of this debate can shed more light on what 
constitutes the pluralist-solidarist dichotomy in the English School. Similar to 
this dichotomy, cosmopolitans and communitarians “sit within a common 
horizon that is anchored in the twin pillars of liberty and equality.”77 Richard 
Shapcott defines the central point of debate as follows: 
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The primary issue at stake in these debates is whether human beings ought to be 
considered as one single moral community, or as a collection of separate 
communities, each with their own ethical standards.78 
 
Not only does this shine a brighter light on what communitarianism might mean, 
it also embeds the discussion into the issue of whether boundaries have an 
ethical foundation. The second part of this dissertation will delve deeper into 
contemporary theorists who have addressed this topic and can therefore be 
roughly placed on one of both sides of the cosmopolitan-communitarian divide. 
The point is to establish a comprehensive understanding of this dichotomy, as it 
might provide us with a better grasp of why the debate among Liberal Peace 
critics like Paris and Chandler is not likely to gain an immediate and permanent 




2. 1. Cosmopolitanism-communitarianism 
 
In International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches, Chris Brown 
relates the dichotomy between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism to the 
moral and political philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel. It is especially their competing arguments on the foundations of morality 
that are to be considered as constitutive aspects of the aforementioned 
dichotomy. The following section will therefore only assess what is held to be 
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essential in the context of a genealogical analysis of the cosmopolitan-
communitarian divide. Furthermore, the argument will follow Chris Brown’s and 
Richard Shapcott’s assessments of these two philosophers rather than founding 
the argument on the primary sources. As a result, the transition will be made to 
more contemporary cosmopolitan and communitarian thinkers while gradually 
assessing the question if these two positions can ever be reconciled. 
 
 
2. 1. 1. Cosmopolitanism: The Moral Value of Our Shared 
Humanity 
 
Regarded as one of the founding theorists of cosmopolitan thought, Immanuel 
Kant’s famous categorical imperative, as a universal guidance of our moral 
action, is held to be the most starkest formulation of the cosmopolitan ideal: “Act 
in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, never simply as means, but always as an end.”80 According 
to Shapcott, Kant’s central thought is that “humans can and should form a 
universal (that is global) moral community. “81 This does not necessarily imply 
the formation of a world government but rather the importance of a “legal order 
based on universal rights and duties.”82 Central to this argument is a direct 
challenge to the moral significance of boundaries between communities, 
between insiders and outsiders, between us and them. Kant’s importance to 
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cosmopolitan thought is therefore undeniable because this challenge lies at the 
heart of nearly every cosmopolitan argument. The idea of a “universal or a priori 
inclusion in the ethical realm”83 implies that “individual human beings are the 
prime concern of morality.”84 Individuals, as Kant noted, should be treated as 
ends in themselves and they therefore, regardless of their nationality or place in 
the world, “deserve equal moral respect because they all share morally 
significant qualities.”85 According to Thomas Pogge, there are three main 
principles in cosmopolitan thought: 
 
First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons 
…. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every 
living human being equally …. Third, generality …: persons are ultimate 
units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, 
or such like.86 
 
Even though the emphasis and interpretation is likely to change among them, 
these three notions return in any form of cosmopolitan argument.  
Although both the amount of cosmopolitan theorists and the different 
strands of cosmopolitanism are quite considerable, Shapcott nonetheless makes 
an important distinction between Kantian and Rawlsian forms. Whereas the 
former puts emphasis on the “universal processes of consent and deliberation 
between real people”87, the latter is to be situated within a contractarian 
tradition of political philosophy. These differences notwithstanding, they both 
thrive on an imperative of duty: like Kant’s deontology of the categorical 
imperative, Rawls’s contractarian foundation to justice has a similar appeal to 
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duty. The sense of duty that drives our moral action is a standard element within 
cosmopolitan philosophy. Moreover, this duty is twofold: a negative duty that 
wants to tackle international and structural causes of injustice on the one hand, 
and a positive duty that seeks to assess human rights violations, if necessary by 
intervention on the other. Combined, these duties heavily argue for taking action 
when harm is being done, internationally or domestically. 
Furthermore, cosmopolitans directly challenge the prevailing political 
and economical order of sovereign states and institutions. This argument is 
founded on the work of John Rawls. In order to obtain an impression of this 
influence, Rawl’s A Theory of Justice is without a doubt a designated starting 
point. In this work, Rawls sought, firstly, to construct the principles of justice 
upon which a well-ordered society should be founded and, secondly, to underpin 
this concept with necessary institutions. Eventually, it would turn out as a 
considerable answer to the perpetual debate between freedom and equality.88 
Relying on social contract theory, he argued that if all people were deprived of 
any form of knowledge about their social status (nationality, gender, race, health, 
wealth) behind a so-called veil of ignorance, they would agree upon principles 
that treated all human beings as equals.89 In short, Rawls deduced two principles 
from this “original position.”90 The first states that every human being has 
“equal basic liberties”91 which cannot be prescribed but have to be “compatible 
with a similar scheme of liberties for others.”92 The only constraint these liberties 
have to take into account is that they by no means can affect the liberties of other 
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people. The second principle therefore states that “social and economic 
inequalities” are only tolerable to the extent that they are in “everyone’s 
advantage” and that positions and offices are open to all.93 What the application 
of the latter principle entails is “the distribution of income and wealth”94 to 
everyone’s advantage. More specifically, inequalities are only tolerable as long as 
they benefit the least advantaged in society. The balance between liberty and 
equality hereby ought to be maintained.  
However, it is important to note that Rawls perceived a lexical order 
between these two principles which requires us to satisfy the first principles in 
the ordering before we can move to the second.95 It is important to keep this in 
mind when one turns to Charles Beitz’s application of Rawls’s domestic 
principles on an international scale. In Political Theory and International 
Relations,96 Beitz argues that a similar veil of ignorance on an international scale 
would enforce an international principle of redistribution of wealth among 
nations, obliging prosperous states to share their resources with the rest of the 
world. The flaw in his argument is that it violates the first principle of liberty and 
neglects the importance of the lexical order. 
Thomas Pogge, on the other hand, made a rather different argument. In 
World Poverty and Human Rights, he argues a strong point for reforming the 
international economical system if we want to combat global poverty. He makes 
a compelling argument by exposing the “juxtaposition of great progress in our 
moral norms and conduct with a rather catastrophic moral situation on the 
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ground”97 as a result of the Western states that are “crushing economic, political, 
and military dominance over a world in which effective enslavement and 
genocides continue unabated.”98  
In order to undo this structural harm, Pogge outlines an approach that 
explores the viability of a different path to globalisation, “involving political as 
well as economic integration,” and allowing every human being ”to share the 
benefits of global economic growth.”99 In other words, the observance that our 
international system is harming the poor is provided with a cosmopolitan 
solution: we have to reform this system structurally in accordance with the 
notion of human rights. A Rawlsian echo is heard when Pogge constructs this 
argument on the appeal of our responsibility.100 By hiding behind the status quo, 
we continue to harm the poor structurally on a global scale, Pogge argues. A 
resort to communal isolation under the ideal of non-intervention would 
therefore have no positive effect on the sort of injustice Pogge is referring to. 
Similar to Paris, Pogge argues that non-intervention can generate ‘dirty hands’ as 
well. 
In addition, cosmopolitans assess another issue wherein inaction has the 
effect of causing harm rather than preventing it, namely when human suffering is 
not caused by the injustice of the international system. The cosmopolitan 
individual is unlikely to neglect victims from genocide, civil war, or other forms 
of violence or conflict and he will therefore reflect on the most effective means to 
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tackle these issues. What is commonly described as humanitarian intervention is 
regarded as a possible answer to these pressing issues, provided there are a few 
criteria that need to be respected in order to prevent mindless justification of 
any form of intervention. According to Shapcott, humanitarian intervention 
represents the “shift from negative to positive cosmopolitan duties.”101 Related 
to Just War Theory (JWT), cosmopolitans have sought to construct a framework 
that enables justified intervention. JWT’s cosmopolitan grounding is most 
notable when it is argued that intervention is necessitated by the denial or 
violation of human rights. Since we have a moral duty to prevent human rights 
violations, cosmopolitans argue, humanitarian intervention is justified when 
these issues can be tackled effectively. 
In this context, Simon Caney argues that because “all persons have duties 
to respect and protect … human rights, it follows that intervention is justified 
when it could successfully protect these rights.”102 In order to prevent more harm 
being done, Caney sets up a framework of JWT-inspired criteria. These include 
the following: there has to be a violation of economic and/or political human 
rights, the intervention has to be proportional with regard to the initial harm, it 
has to be the last resort only when the alternatives have more negative 
outcomes, there has to be a reasonable chance of a positive outcome, and it has 
to be executed by the proper authority.103 If these criteria are met, humanitarian 
intervention is justified and the likelihood of taking on the form of a 
cosmopolitan crusade is minimised. Once again, the whole argument is framed in 
terms of rights and duties. These should be equal to all human beings and 
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borders are not allowed to pose constraints to them. This thought will form the 
most central point of disagreement with the communitarians who severely 
challenge the cosmopolitan’s core assumption of moral universalism. 
 
 
2. 1. 2. Communitarianism: The Embeddedness of Our Moral 
Values 
 
Communitarian thought is, like its cosmopolitan counterpart, grounded in a 
specific conception of morality that constituted itself as a countermovement to 
cosmopolitanism. G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophy was partly formulated in reaction 
to the prevailing philosophy of Kant that cherished moral universalism and 
individualism. Hegel objected to the pure formality of the Kant’s philosophy and 
denied the possibility “to think of individuals … in isolation from the 
community that has shaped them and constituted them as individuals.”104 Now 
because of the embeddedness of individuals in their community, Hegel 
differentiates abstract morality from ethics, i.e. “concrete morality of a rational 
order where rational institutions and laws provide the content of conscientious 
conviction.”105 Political community, in the form of the modern state, “is the 
culmination of history, superior to all previous social forms, because it is only 
within the modern state that an ethical life which allows freedom for all is 
realised.”106 In other words, though Hegel shares the same Kantian ideal of 
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freedom for all, he deems the modern state as its most necessary condition. The 
state provides the individual with rules that order the relations among people, 
thereby replacing the separateness of civil society with communitarian unity.  
When we assess the notion of communitarianism, Hegel’s argument as 
formulated in opposition to Kant’s is by no means coincidental. To begin with, 
there seems to be a notable absence of a unified theory of communitarianism. 
Even the name has not gained widespread agreement. This reactionary 
foundation of communitarianism implies that there are rather loosely coherent 
groups of theories or approaches that share a critical attitude towards the 
central arguments of cosmopolitanism. At their core, these approaches “claim 
that morality is always local, and therefore that cosmopolitanism is both 
impossible (impractical) and undesirable.”107 Morality and its meaning, these 
voices claim, are derived from the cultural communities to which we belong. 
Shapcott defines two main expressions of what he defines as anti-
cosmopolitanism: realism and pluralism.108 In the remainder of this part, both 
these groups of critics will be addressed and, subsequently, the question will be 
raised what the implication might be for cosmopolitan’s negative and positive 
duties.  
Realism, as one of the prevailing theories in IR, is mostly known for its 
critique of morality in favour of power. It is this critical assessment of the 
relationship between morality and power that leads them to “a recognition of the 
normative pluralism characterising the international realm and a scepticism 
towards progressivist account of international life.”109 Realists define the field of 
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IR as an anarchical system of sovereign states. Any reference to moral principles 
is exposed as serving state interests in some way or another. But they are also 
concerned about maintaining an order of balance and stability. “Such an order is 
a prerequisite for the security and stability of the communities which make it 
up.” 110  In other words, most realists are communitarians but not all 
communitarians are realists.  
However, realism’s emphasis on an order of sovereign communities is a 
concern that can also be attributed to pluralism. It is here that the similarity 
between pluralist and solidarist strands of thought in the English School on the 
one hand and the cosmopolitan-communitarian divide on the other hand, is to be 
located. As mentioned in the introduction, pluralism can be regarded as the 
strongest challenge to cosmopolitanism’s universalising aspirations. 
Contemporary pluralists, like David Miller and Michael Walzer, argue that 
“cosmopolitanism requires the universalization of a particular account of the 
good and the overriding of particular understandings and ‘shared ways of 
life’.”111 They heavily stress the moral significance of equality, preventing the 
imposition of the moral principles of one community over those of another. 
Eventually, this leads to the moral significance of recognising identity and 
difference. 
 
To be human is to have a culture, and to belong to a community less than the 
species is to identify with one’s community of origin or belonging. Therefore, the 
way to realise this goal is to preserve and recognize these cultural differences.112 
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The impracticability of cosmopolitanism, as Chandler states, is mainly due to the 
significant differences between communities, be it cultural, statist, or religious. 
This pluralism inhibits any prospect of a universally accepted notion of the good 
life or of the nature of justice. Morality, in other words, is context-sensitive and 
our duties only go as far as our identity, shared culture, and moral conceptions 
reach. According to Michael Walzer, a universal community of humanity is 
therefore inherently unrealistic. “The crucial commonality of the human race is 
particularism: we participate, all of us, in thick cultures that are our own.”113 
This latter thought poses severe limits to the positive and negative duties 
cosmopolitanism so heavily endorses. If every moral concept is contextually 
rooted in a community, the idea of founding the basis for moral action on 
universal ideals suddenly becomes less evident. This clearly resonates in 
Chandler’s critique of the moral universalist foundations of R2P. Although most 
communitarians are by no means isolationists and some, like Walzer, have made 
considerable attempts to reconcile moral particularism with the notion of 
humanitarian intervention,114 the question remains how far this argument can be 
taken. From a pluralist rather than a statist or realist perspective, one might 
agree with a ‘live and let live’ principle that underpins the norm of no harm. 
Nevertheless, Pogge’s far-reaching argument for institutional reform on the basis 
of human rights is a problematic endeavour when founded on the universalising 
aspirations of the human rights framework. Yet even if one was able to succeed 
in such an attempt, the result would still be an international system of sovereign 
communities constrained by the principle of non-intervention. Isaiah Berlin’s 
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distinction between positive and negative liberty with a preference for the latter 
seems to provoke moral indifference.115 This is what Edward S. Herman notices 
in the foreword to Chandler’s From Kosovo to Kabul. It once more addresses the 
‘dirty hands’ of non-intervention. 
 
Negative liberty is not costless; in an independent society, ‘leaving people alone’ 
affects other people when those left alone … implement disinvestment policies 
that leave communities stranded. … The language of Isaiah Berlin … is the 
language of laissez-faire and neoliberalism.116 
 
Even the ideal of negative liberty does not refrain one from remaining blind and 
indifferent to the harm that befalls these communities. The only way to prevent 
this outcome would then be to extend one’s duties across boundaries and 
intervene within the confines of Caney’s framework. But grounding this action 
on universal morality is a doomed enterprise because morality is always 
particular and cannot be extended across communal boundaries. More so, it 
would open the door for a complete rejection of intervention because if there are 
no moral justifications at stake, one could easily conclude that state interests are 
the true motivation behind intervening. And even if one does not concur with 
this realist argument, the lack of an alternative framework for addressing these 
issues is not a sufficient reason for justifying this one. If not moral indifference, 
moral relativism refrains us from taking action. 
Attempts by Pogge and Caney to construct frameworks to prevent human 
rights violations on the basis of universal principles are directly challenged by 
the particularity and embeddedness of these principles and the imposing effect 
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these policies would entail. However, it is important to note that John Rawls 
made a considerable attempt on his own to transcend the domestic towards the 
international realm when he gauged the principles of international justice. 
Widely neglected and mostly misunderstood, The Law of Peoples can be 




2. 2. Overcoming the Catch 22? 
 
Rawls disagreed with cosmopolitan attempts to apply the central principles of A 
Theory of Justice on the international realm. Along with the negative reception 
The Law of Peoples (LOP) fostered among cosmopolitans, this disagreement 
contributed to a widespread negligence of the latter work. More so, by falsely 
labelling it as communitarian, one might argue it has engendered 
misunderstanding as well. The aim of LOP is to start from the plurality of 
different conceptions of justice because failing to do so is what nourished 
communitarian critics. To the same extent that we start out from a liberal notion 
of justice, we have to acknowledge “different kinds of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines”117 among communities other than our own. But this does not 
inevitably imply the relativism of pluralism. Rawls aims to extent the boundaries 
of what is realistically possible as far as possible.118 Put differently, he wants to 
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ascertain how far he can succeed in extending the cosmopolitan ideals without 
being vulnerable to the communitarian critique. 
This exercise in balance is a recurring narrative throughout the work. 
Rawls focuses on peoples instead of individuals (like cosmopolitans) or states 
(like realist communitarians) and he seeks to construct an international 
framework that is not merely western on the one hand but still sets boundaries 
to toleration on the other hand. This framework, The Law of Peoples, is what 
“well-ordered peoples”119 would agree upon as “a particular political conception 
of right and justice.”120 The crux of his reasoning is to see which peoples he 
counts as belonging to this society of well-ordered peoples. Blinded by their 
universalising aspirations, cosmopolitan liberals are unaware that their 
argument is not only unrealistic but risks justifying arrogance and imperialism 
as well.121 Communitarians on the other hand cling to the pluralist ideal and as 
such are blind to what happens within domestic society. A Society of Peoples 
therefore does not solely consist of liberal peoples but of decent peoples as well. 
Although the latter are not liberal they should nonetheless be tolerated: 
 
Provided a nonliberal society’s basic institutions meet certain specified 
conditions of political right and justice and lead its people to honor a reasonable 
and just law for the Society of Peoples, a liberal people is to tolerate and accept 
that society.122 
 
The notion of decent peoples presents itself as an alternative to cosmopolitan’s 
exclusionary standards of tolerance and communitarianism indifference towards 
intolerance. Even though elaborating on the content of this notion might be an 
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interesting endeavour, it would exceed the scope of the present enquiry. What is 
more important here is it to see how Rawls assumes the existence of non-liberal 
peoples or societies that nonetheless share some important norms and values 
with their liberal counterparts (for instance, respect for human rights that is 
embedded in the framework of domestic law). This thought is considerably more 
important, as it can refute the claim that human rights are a purely Western or 
liberal notion.123 
However, there are two other types of peoples Rawls distinguishes 
between.124 Apart from liberal and decent peoples that form the Society of 
Peoples, there are burdened societies that are not able to join this society and 
outlaw states that are not willing to.125 Whereas one might wonder what Rawls’s 
criterion of differentiation is that enables him to make this distinction, the 
essential claim here is that well-ordered societies (liberal and decent) share a 
responsibility to provide assistance to burdened societies. At this point, Rawls’s 
own reasoning mostly challenges his defence of non-intervention. Avoiding 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater, Rawls wants to prevent the moral 
ignorance of communitarianism by providing the Society of Peoples with a moral 
responsibility. This “duty of assistance”126 has to pose limits to the norm of non-
intervention without lapsing into cosmopolitan universalism and paternalism. 
Rawls therefore argues that there has to be a cut-off point in this assistance that 
has to assure political autonomy.127 Posing limits to our responsibility is a clear 
contestation of Beitz’s international distributive principle. Rawls namely holds 
                                                        
123 Ibid, p. 68 
124 There is a fifth type, benevolent absolutisms, which will not be discussed here. 
125 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 4 
126 Ibid, p. 5 
127 Ibid, p. 118 
 
45 
liberal and decent peoples responsible for providing burdened societies with the 
necessary tools for joining the Society of Peoples. But as soon as this point is 
reached, all assistance has to be ceased for the preservation of political 
autonomy, allowing these societies to choose their own way in reaching the 
Society of Peoples. 
This argument fostered much critique from a cosmopolitan perspective. 
Rawls’ restrained positions towards non-liberal societies and low standards of 
toleration lead Simon Caney to argue that Rawls “allows racial discrimination, 
the political exclusion of ethnic minorities, and the forcible removal of 
members of some ethnic communities (that is, ethnic cleansing).”128 Not only is 
there no such thing as an approval of the aforementioned horrors within LOP; it 
is this reading that seems to be missing the point. The duty of assistance actually 
provides us with the necessary tool to place The Law of Peoples in a more 
progressive light. Such a reading can be found in Huw Williams’s On Rawls, 
Development and Global Justice. The Freedom of Peoples, in which the author 
exposes creeping cosmopolitanism in Rawls’s treatment of the duty of 
assistance.129 According to Williams, there is an undeniable convergence between 
The Law of Peoples and some of the cosmopolitan ideas.130 One might argue that 
they both share the same norms and values, entrenched in the ideal of liberal 
democracy, but Rawls is more cautious to spread these for the fear of 
ethnocentrism. To avoid this, Rawls is willing to pay a high price in favour of 
tolerance. Although he undoubtedly wants to see progress towards liberal 
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societies (as he considers the liberal democratic framework inherently superior), 
he is aware that this conviction can be largely attributed to his comprehensive 
doctrine that belongs to the community that he takes part in. There should 
therefore be a creed of tolerance among political communities and their 
respective cultures. This urge for tolerance severely challenges any progressive 
reading of assistance. The only way to assist other societies without acting 
ethnocentric would be to provide neutral advice that, contrary to Paris’s IBL 
approach, “does not favour the development of liberal institutions.”131 However, 
Williams argues that, since we have the inevitable tendency from our own 
comprehensive doctrine to regard institution-building as democracy building, 
Paris’s emphasis on the lack of an alternative thrusts itself into the argument 
once more. Rawls’s whole endeavour is therefore on the verge of collapsing due 
to this insoluble tension. 
 
We seem to be caught in a Catch 22: sit back and allow burdened societies to find 
their own way in reforming their institutions, and so renege on the duty of 
assistance, or provide them with advice and know-how, inevitably steeped in 
liberal and democratic traditions and values, and thereby fall foul of 
paternalism.132 
 
Rawls’s attempt to bridge the gap between cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism has actually made the dilemma between them more 
persistent and hopeless than before. It formulates quite clearly what was lurking 
in the first part of this dissertation. Paris wants to build institutions that could 
successfully implement liberalisation but is not aware of the cosmopolitan, and 
hence ethnocentric and paternalistic, policies this entails. Chandler therefore 
sought to expose this uncritical critique by claiming these policies are breaching 
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international norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention. This however, 
would be refusing to take on our responsibility and so hiding behind the moral 
relativism of the status quo. After a closer look at the underlying debate between 
cosmopolitans and communitarians, the stalemate between our duty to engage 
with others caused by our shared humanity on the one hand, and the notion of 
moral pluralism that severely limits any such engagement on the other hand, 
seems to be irreconcilable. A Catch 22 between these two positions seems to be 
eternally contained within every argument. This in turn impedes any attempt at 




Towards a Phronetic Approach 
 
There is however, a different strand of literature that has been addressing this 
topic from a diverging perspective. Both within the Liberal Peace debate and in 
the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, there is a distinct narrative that is 
looking for a way to transcend the ever-recurring dilemma by shifting the scope 
on dialogue between communities. This cosmopolitanism of a different kind or 
dialogical communitarianism stresses the unsustainability of a strongly polarised 
debate between universalist cosmopolitans and relativist communitarians. 133 
In the last part of this dissertation, a brief overview will be given of the 
main proponents of this argument. Broaching the work of Oliver P. Richmond in 
the Liberal Peace debate on the one hand, and Andrew Linklater and Richard 
Shapcott on the other will call the persistency of the intervention dilemma into 
question. Eventually, the importance these authors place on dialogue that takes 
into account the context of the everyday leads us to critically assess the 
endeavour of producing theoretical frameworks. The explication of this latter 
point in Chris Brown’s and especially Bent Flyvbjerg’s assessment of the 
Aristotelian notion of phronesis will form the conclusion of this last part. 
 
 
                                                        




3. 1. A Post-Liberal Peace? 
 
Avoiding “over-reliance on predatory institutional frameworks”134 while still 
engaging with others is the main challenge Oliver P. Richmond addresses in A 
post-liberal peace: Eirenism and the everyday. Acknowledging the crisis in liberal 
peacebuilding and its underlying thesis, he argues that we need to transcend this 
framework in search for a Post-Liberal Peace that bridges the gap between the 
liberal and the local (or non-liberal) subject. According to Richmond, the 
bankruptcy of the Liberal Peace is caused by its agenda “to reshape rather than 
engage with non-liberal others.”135 There has to be an equality of respecting 
cultural differences that does not entail relativism. “What is missing is dialogue 
and communication”136 that takes into account the everyday context of the local 
while maintaining “empathy, respect, and the recognition of difference.”137 In 
other words, a Post-Liberal Peace framework puts dialogue between 
communities at its core and starts from the everyday context. Such a framework 
calls into question the moral significance of the Westphalian system of states 
that produces patterns of exclusion and tends to neglect this practical context. 
Rather than imply a complete rejection of boundaries, it proposes a critical 
assessment of the state system instead. This is the prospect of producing 
sustainable peace that bridges the local with the international.  
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In other words, to gain an understanding of the ‘indigenous’ and everyday 
factors for the overall project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media 
needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of 
international prescription and assumptions about peace.138 
 
Negligence in engaging the everyday or local context is what jeopardises any 
form of peacebuilding, liberal or not. Like Chandler, Richmond argues that there 
is a need for “a system that protects difference”139 and does not fail to engage the 
issues that matter in the context of local everyday. Inevitably, this calls for a 
more complex process of peacebuilding in which different relationships between 
different communities produce different forms of peace. Roger Mac Ginty defines 
this as a hybrid peace.140  
Eventually, a dialogical perspective on peace favours a balance between 
specific contexts and responsive international institutions over endless quarrels 
about rights and rules.141 As such, Richmond moves beyond abstract frameworks 
that fail to assess the local context. Building peace in this dialogical sense also 
produces emancipation. “This transcends Rawlsian liberal approaches … by 
focussing on self-government in which the citizen becomes the force in the 
process of peacebuilding.”142 
The key question is how this ongoing process actually works. How does 
the engagement with the local work in the practical sense? Rejecting the blind 
application of frameworks, Richmond provides a set of requirements for 
peacebuilders. These suggest a consideration of the everyday life, the assessment 
of each case individually instead of blindly applying blueprints, placing human 
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needs first, and seeking open and free communication between post-conflict 
individuals and peace builders.143 Any more specific guidelines would blur the 
distinction between multiple cases or contexts.  He therefore argues that it is not 
in his interest to provide a universally applicable framework for peacebuilding. 
 
This  i.e. a Post-Liberal Peace  would not be a new hegemonic ‘ism’ or a grand 
metanarrative, but instead would be a mechanism or lens through which it can 
be locally asked whether and how an action, conversation, or policy contributes 
to a mutual form of peace.144 
 
This enthralling argument that rejects the polarised dichotomy between the 
application of frameworks and devastating critiques of interventionism raises 
some interesting and indispensable questions. How does this conversation take 
place and under what circumstances? Which communities are involved? And 
what about the accusation that this call for dialogue is a liberally entrenched 
notion that does not escape ethnocentrism? These questions can only be tackled 
by relating the Liberal Peace debate to the cosmopolitan-communitarian divide 
that underpins it. This entrenchment has been disentangled by a so-called thin 
notion of cosmopolitanism that embraces dialogical communitarianism. 
 
 
3. 2. Dialogical Politics 
 
In The Transformation of Political Community, Andrew Linklater argues that a 
thin notion of cosmopolitanism is a viable alternative to thick cosmopolitanism, 
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for the latter cannot discard ethnocentrism and false universality. But we should 
not descend to moral relativism, he argues. We have to reflect on how others are 
excluded without making abstraction of our own context. “We have to start from 
where we are”145, as Richard Rorty stated and it is exactly the absence of this 
realisation that produces thick cosmopolitanism’s flawed universalism. What 
challenges moral parochialism on the other hand, is similar to Pogge’s argument, 
a close consideration of the causes and consequences of transnational harm. 
“Transnational harm provides one of the strongest reasons for widening the 
boundaries of moral and political communities to engage outsiders in dialogue 
about matters which affect their vital interests.”146The stark dichotomy between 
communitarianism and cosmopolitanism is weakened by what Linklater defines 
as dialogical politics that combine the communitarian norm of starting from 
where you are and the cosmopolitan ideal of engaging with others. Not only is 
dialogue a prosperous means to tackle transnational harm, it also resolves the 
issue of ethnocentrism. By submitting “the logic of their own beliefs to the test of 
open dialogue with others”147, the possible ethnocentricity of certain values or 
norms is critically assessed. 
One could argue that Linklater extends Rawls’s Society of Peoples by 
widening “the circle of those who have rights to participate in dialogue.”148 
Richmond made a similar suggestion when stressing the importance of “a 
broader social contract, or more ambitiously, one that transcends liberal … 
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biases.”149 Dialogue transcends cultural differences without discarding them 
completely. Linklater’s widened circle of inclusion is grounded on Jürgen 
Habermas’ notion of discourse ethics, which holds that people should engage in 
dialogue without knowing who will learn from who, by reaching agreement 
based on the force of the better argument, taking into account the perspective of 
the other, and aiming to agree on universal principles.150 In short, Linklater 
argues that “principles that bridge different cultures must result from 
unconstrained dialogue in which participants face each other as equals.”151 
There is however, still an exclusionary pattern in this form of dialogue. 
According to Shapcott, Linklater’s Habermassian version of dialogical politics is 
exclusionary in two ways. Firstly, discourse ethics is unnecessarily restrictive 
and has a “legislative tendency because it excludes from conversation all 
statements, or all topics of conversation that are not oriented towards achieving 
universal redemption.”152 Only those voices that share the goal of moral 
universalism are included in the conversation. Secondly, it has a limited concept 
of agency because it argues that “moral conversation can only be conducted 
between post-conventional agents guided by the force of the better argument.”153 
This implies an exclusion of conventional agents that have more “traditional 
social practices and conceptions of the good life.”154 Including these voices is 
tied to the notion of emancipation, one of the key concepts to critical theory. 
However, this seriously erodes equality, for the “other’s equality is only realised 
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when they are emancipated.”155 The intention, as Richmond previously stated, 
is to engage rather than reshape the other. 
Shapcott nonetheless wants to preserve the advantageous elements of 
discourse ethics while eliminating some of its more problematic side effects. He 
embraces dialogical politics as it rejects the bifurcation between 
communitarianism and cosmopolitanism.156 The strong and artificial polarisation 
between these two traditions of thought has not provided a workable solution. 
Dialogical politics could provide a viable alternative only if it was to be 
consolidated into a more inclusionary model that provides an “alternative 
understanding of conversation.” 157  This model is to be found in the 
hermeneutical philosophy of H.-G. Gadamer. Shapcott claims that inclusionary 
universalism of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is facilitated by its emphasis on 
understanding as a linguistic event that is necessarily dialogical. 158  The 
implication of Gadamer’s notion of understanding for Shapcott’s model of 
conversation is indicated by the central argument in Gadamer’s Truth and 
Method. 159  All knowledge is interpretation, Gadamer argues, because we 
experience the world through language and knowledge is therefore constituted 
linguistically. This implies that, in Heideggerian terms, our being-in-the-world is 
fundamentally linguistic. The scope of our knowledge and experience is 
therefore constrained by our “human situatedness”160. These individual horizons 
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merge through the notion of understanding into a “fusion of horizons.”161 In the 
process of dialogue, we broaden our horizon of knowledge and experience by 
engaging with each other. Conversation is thereby “a process of coming to an 
understanding”162 in which self and other are constituted as equals without 
ironing out differences or the uncertainty over which truth the other possesses 
and what one might learn through the conversation.163 
This notion of dialogue is radically inclusive for it lacks the restrictions of 
Habermassian discourse ethics. Reaching understanding through dialogue is “a 
capacity of any linguistically constituted agent.”164 Agents are not required to be 
post-conventional or emancipated. What humans have in common is not a 
particular language but rather their linguistical situatedness and since this is a 
basic feature of human existence, their level of development is irrelevant. 
“Conversation is a property of all humans who posses language regardless of 
their situatedness.”165 Moreover, there is no normative principle that excludes 
any conversation that is not oriented towards universal principles of moral life. 
It is more about “the possibility of agreement” than “necessarily revealing 
knowledge that is universally valid.”166 A conversation is mainly directed towards 
understanding rather than a universal ideal. Eventually, this is the only way to 
bridge communal differences. 
 
In the absence of a final consensus or completed community of emancipated 
beings there is instead the task of living together in difference, a task which 
requires a mediation of means and ends, universal and particular and the 
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pragmatic development of wisdom and understanding in which differences and 
agreements are worked through.167 
 
Rather than an endpoint of universal principles of morality, the process of 
conversation as a means to reach understanding should be the goal of dialogical 
politics. There is actually a resonance in this thought that rejects the founding 
principles of morality that both communitarianism and cosmopolitanism 
vehemently defend. Instead of clinging to these principles, dialogical politics goes 
beyond the dichotomy of moral relativism and universalism through the process 
of dialogical understanding. Another echo in Shapcott’s argument is the notion of 
understanding each other, not only as a norm but also as a constitutive aspect of 
acquiring knowledge and experience. Applied to Richmond’s notion of the 
everyday context, in dialogical politics we reach understanding by engaging with 
each other in an equal relationship that takes into account the situatedness of 
every conversant. 
Even so, a rejection of universal frameworks in favour of dialogical 
politics that takes into account the everyday urges the critical mind to ponder 
how this ideal can be applied within a contextual situation. More so, what does 
this ‘pragmatic development of wisdom and understanding’ imply in concrete 
terms? A suitable answer to this question and the implication it has for 
frameworks of intervention and non-intervention might see Gadamer’s notion of 
practical knowledge as a good starting point. 
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3. 3. Phronesis and Power 
 
Gadamer reintroduces the Aristotelian distinction between theoretical and 
practical knowledge or phronesis, describing the latter as “directed towards the 
concrete situation.”168 It is not a rational conceptualisation of knowledge but 
rather an ethical virtue, asking the question what one ought to do or not and so 
presupposing a moral attitude that is absent in a rational account of 
knowledge.169 
In The Nicomachean Ethics,170 Aristotle defines phronetic knowledge in 
sharp contrast to two other forms of knowledge, episteme (scientific knowledge) 
and techne (technical knowledge). Epistemic knowledge is knowledge “that 
cannot be otherwise than it is”171 and consequently produces what we presently 
define as the modern ideal of scientific knowledge that is by nature universal and 
context-independent. Through analytical rationality, knowledge is constituted 
that is invariable in time and space.172 Techne and phronesis on the other hand 
represent two contrasting roles of intellectual work. The former is identical to 
what we know as technical knowledge or know-how. It concerns the application 
of technical knowledge that is variable and context-dependent.173 Of phronetic 
knowledge or prudence on the other hand, Aristotle argues the following: “it is a 
true state, reasoned and capable of action with regard to things that are good or 
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bad for man.”174 Practical knowledge is inherently directed towards action. It 
purports the action of making a practical judgement based on values within the 
confines of specific cases.175 “The particular and the situationally dependent are 
emphasized over the universal and over rules.”176 Put differently, a phronetic 
notion of science embraces a radically different approach to the production and 
goals of knowledge than its epistemic variant. It places higher value on 
knowledge that is practically minded than it does on knowledge that is 
theoretically centred.  
One might then wonder what made this switch come about. Why is the 
prevailing notion of science, both social and natural, epistemic and why does it 
concern the production of context-independent and universally applicable 
theory? Stephen Toulmin locates the shift from a phronetic to an epistemic ideal 
of science in the 17th century. Philosophers like René Descartes and Thomas 
Hobbes on the one hand and scientists like Isaac Newton and Galileo Galilei on 
the other hand challenged the prevailing ideals of Renaissance humanism.177 
Logic displaced rhetoric, general principles and theories where favoured over 
particular cases and examples, and moral reasoning became theoretically-
centred as opposed to practically minded. Our contemporary notion of the 
objective, universal and context-independent ideal of science is so persistent that 
there is no English term for phronesis. Furthermore, according to Richard J. 
Bernstein, the major issue at hand is that we have become incapable of 
conceiving what such an approach might look like. Strikingly, Bernstein’s 
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account of this transformation exposes the familiarity between phronetic or 
practical forms of science or rationality on the one hand, and the ideal of a 
dialogical community that has been examined in the first part of this chapter on 
the other hand. 
 
When Aristotle sought to clarify what he meant by phronesis …, he could still 
call upon the vivid memory of Pericles as the concrete exemplar of the individual 
who possessed the faculty of discriminating what was good for himself and for 
the polis. But today, when we seek for concrete examples of dialogical 
communities in which practical rationality flourishes, we are at much greater 
loss.178 
 
Aristotle stressed the importance of all three intellectual virtues (episteme, 
techne, and phronesis) in order to achieve a well-functioning society. The demise 
of phronesis not only inhibits any prospect of such a society or community, it has 
also, following Bent Flyvbjerg, provoked the failure of the social scientific 
enterprise.179 The oft-pictured contrast between impotent social sciences and 
potent natural or exact sciences is flawed because the epistemic ideal of the 
natural sciences is applied to the social sciences. Social science, Flyvbjerg argues, 
has to “drop all pretence, however indirect, at emulating the success of the 
natural sciences in producing cumulative and predictive theory.”180 Social 
science can only matter, he continues, when it swaps episteme for phronesis. 
More so, in terms of phronesis, social sciences will become more potent 
compared to the natural sciences. 
Before we swing back to the notion of intervention, the final step in this 
section of the analysis is to assess the characteristics of “phronetic social science 
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research.”181 Flyvbjerg argues that we have to probe three “value-rational 
questions:”182 
 
1. Where are we going? 
2. Is this development desirable? 
3. What, if anything, should we do about it? 
 
Through the process of pondering the question what kind of research these 
questions might imply, the similarity with the characteristics of dialogical 
politics that are seeping through will be discarded as merely coincidental. The 
argument will be made that the phronetic ideal of science equally penetrates 
dialogical politics as phronetic social sciences.  
Firstly, as Rorty and Linklater stated, one has to admit that there is no 
neutral ground or “view from nowhere”183, so one has to start from where one is 
in the world. Secondly, identical to the ideal of dialogical politics, the answers 
one provides to the questions have to be put into an “ongoing dialogue about the 
problems”184 that are the topic of discussion. Furthermore, since these questions 
entail a discussion about values, the more fundamental argument between 
foundationalism and relativism is unavoidable. And this is where the 
cosmopolitan-communitarian quarrel over the foundations of moral actions 
casts its largest shadow. On what principle or norm do we ground our action and 
values? As Bernstein argued, although there may be nothing that can satisfy our 
longing for a “fixed Archimedean point upon which we can secure our thought 
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and action”185, the dichotomy between objectivists and relativists is deeply 
questioned by phronesis or practical judgement. As clarified in part two of this 
dissertation, cosmopolitans and communitarians have been eager to found their 
moral philosophy on such an Archimedean point, i.e. our shared humanity versus 
our communal contextuality. Assessing this dichotomy from a phronetic and 
context-dependent perspective, the quarrel of so-called ‘isms’ is intentionally 
ignored. “Phronetic social scientists reject both these ‘isms’ and replace them 
with contextualism or situational ethics.”186 They get more close to reality “by 
anchoring their research in the context studied, … thereby ensuring what 
Gadamer called a hermeneutic ‘fusion of horizons’.”187 Subsequently, they “focus 
on practical activity and practical knowledge in everyday situations in society”, 
i.e. the “everyday life.”188 Bernstein’s notion of “Cartesian anxiety”189 or, in this 
context, fear of opening the door open to relativism is superfluous; the epistemic 
ideal has never fostered the anticipated results in social sciences.190 Eventually, 
this opens up an ongoing context-dependent dialogue between “the local context, 
which gives phenomena their immediate meaning” and the “international and 
global context, in which phenomena can be appreciated for their general and 
conceptual significance.” 191  The mutually assuming relationship between 
dialogical politics and the ideal of phronetic science is thereby undoubtedly 
established as two sides of the same coin.  
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The last part of the analysis will involve the question of how this can be 
related to the issue of intervention. The idea of a renewed assessment of the 
cosmopolitan-communitarian stalemate by engaging it from an Aristotelian 
perspective and entangle it accordingly is not an entirely new endeavour. Chris 
Brown has argued that by shifting from the Kantian question ‘what should we 
do?’ to an Aristotelian one that asks ‘how should we live?’, we swap an 
intentionalist or deontological ethics for a consequentialist or virtue ethics.192 
Following Martha Nussbaum, Brown holds that an Aristotelian turn may be the 
best way to break the cosmopolitan-communitarian impasse but requires more 
elaboration.193  Accordingly, Brown has recently broached Flyvbjerg’s account of 
social scientific research by consequently applying the Aristotelian concept of 
phronesis on various topics within IR. 194  With regards to humanitarian 
interventions, Brown argues that judgement of whether or not to intervene 
should be based on the specific circumstances and the context of the case rather 
than applying a universal framework that obtains objective rules about 
intervention. 
 
In dealing with complex situations, such as deciding whether it is right that one 
state should interfere forcibly in the affairs of another, there is no substitute for 
a form of moral reasoning that involves a judgement that takes into account the 
totality of circumstances, rather than seeks for a rule to apply.195 
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Moral reasoning about humanitarian intervention should not be a ‘box-ticking’ 
procedure. Similar to Chandler’s critical contention that R2P’s criteria are a 
checklist which requires all criteria to be met in order to justify intervention, 
Brown argues that “what we have here is not a pro-forma check-list of criteria 
whereby action is deemed just only when we are able to put a tick into each box” 
but rather a requirement for “a practically minded judgement … based on all 
the circumstances of a particular case.”196 This quite mercilessly discards the 
viability of frameworks like Paris’s six institutional reforms that have to precede 
liberalisation or Caney’s criteria for humanitarian interventions. 
Brown rightly points to “the neo-positivist assumptions of mainstream 
IR” as a symptom of the fact that a turn to practice, steeped in Aristotelian 
phronesis, is not “yet firmly established in the repertoire of the discourse of 
IR.”197 By bringing back under attention Hans Morgenthau’s policy advice to 
American diplomats, Brown holds that IR has always been dominantly epistemic. 
The problem raised by Morgenthau’s emphasis on the practice of diplomacy 
however, is that “experience of the world is central to the exercise of practical 
reason.”198 If the everyday context of the local has to be taken into account and 
knowledge has to be acquired through practice, any assessment of issues of 
intervention is futile when not founded on experience that cannot be learned 
from books. Although it is thought-provoking to note how Brown reminds us 
that “most of us, young and old, lack experience of the big issues of international 
political life”199, there is one feature missing in his analysis that threatens his 
argument with collapse. Crucially, this missing link is what prevents a phronetic 
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approach to the intervention dilemma from becoming an anything goes method 
of applying judgement that exalts arbitrariness and inconsistency.200 To clarify 
this, we have to return to the value-rational questions a phronetic social scientist 
raises. Flyvbjerg adds a fourth question to the list which inquires “Who gains and 
who loses, and by which mechanisms of power?”201 Like Brown, both Aristotle 
and Gadamer did not include an analysis and consideration of power when 
engaging the notion of phronesis. However, Flyvbjerg argues, when thinking 
about how issues can be assessed, “we must advance from the original 
conception of phronesis to one explicitly including power.”202 This importance is 
clearly advocated by Richard Bernstein as well: 
 
No practical discussion is going to take place unless you understand the 
relevance of phronesis. But no practical philosophy can be adequate for our time 
unless it confronts the analysis of power and how it operates in our everyday 
lives.203 
 
Along with the classical questions as noted by Aristotle, the phronetic scientist 
has to wonder how power operates within particular issues. This will lead him to 
ask the following questions: 
 
 “Who gains and who loses?” 
 “Through what kinds of power relations?” 
 “What possibilities are available to change existing power relations?” 
 “What are the power relations among those who ask the questions?”204 
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Negligence to include these questions into the assessment of any issue, like for 
instance interventionism, inevitably shifts towards the direction of voluntarism 
and a general lack of criticism. There is no general framework, as it concerns 
context-dependent knowledge that is rooted in the everyday lives of the people 
who are involved in the particular issue. Instead, we have to ask detailed 
questions and construct narratives that ask who is getting and who is using 
power and for what reason. We have to clarify the problems we are facing and 
entangle them by arguing how things can be done differently. This process is an 
ongoing dialogue that will never produce final answers.205 
The constitutive importance of considering the notion of power is 
strikingly echoed in David Chandler’s critique of the so-called uncritical Liberal 
Peace critics when they take “an uncritical approach to power.”206 Moreover, 
negligence of this consideration opens the door for the “vague and ambitious 
‘ethical checklists’”207 that justify intervention. Taking power into consideration 
effectively challenges the moral universalism of cosmopolitanism that is 
consequently exposed as an empire in denial.208 Unfortunately, delving into the 
notion of power too deeply would exceed the scope of this dissertation. Rather, 
the crucial point being made here is that the abovementioned questions on 
power reveal some crucial insights in the context of intervention. Who gains and 
who loses when an intervention is waged or not? What are the power relations 
among the parties involved? And can these relations be changed? Especially 
Flyvbjerg’s last question on power penetrates the core of the relationship 
between dialogical politics and phronetic social sciences most strikingly. By 
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pondering what the power relations are among those who ask the questions, i.e. 
the scientists, the latter are unambiguously drawn into the whole enterprise. 
When we assess the notion of intervention from a phronetic perspective, we are 
no longer epistemic data collectors or academics in an ivory tower. It concerns 
our position towards the subject we are analysing. We engage with the everyday 
lives of people and place ourselves as one voice among others in the dialogue 
about the issues that either require to intervene or not, for the sake of ending 
human suffering.  
 
Phronetic social science is dialogical in the sense that it incorporates, and, if 
successful, itself is incorporated into, a polyphony of voices, with no one voice, 
including that of the researcher, claiming final authority.209 
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Intervening in other societies as something to be avoided and rejected is without 
a doubt an easy and tempting matter to argue. Occasionally, this pendulum of 
criticism tends to swing in the extreme direction of radicalism and cynicism. As 
such, the whole discussion risks being maintained by extreme voices shouting 
back and forth. In The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo,210 Noam 
Chomsky argues that international politics should be guided by the principle of 
“do no harm”211, as the prevailing assessments of intervention justifications are 
frequently inconsistent. He even references Bull’s warning that powerful actors 
might define themselves as judges of the common good without taking into 
account deferring opinions and thusly make themselves the menace to effective 
action in this world. 212  Although this is an accurate assertion, Chomsky 
nevertheless seems to be missing the point Bull was trying to make. Although he 
was aware of the problems any solidarism of the will had to acknowledge, Bull 
foresaw the impediment any adherence to the status quo could present to efforts 
against human suffering. Exploring plausible prospects to safeguard such 
attempts, sadly neglected by Chomsky, is one of the core ideas that moved this 
dissertation.  
Assessing the notion of intervention through the perspective of 
cosmopolitan and communitarian traditions of thought, this dissertation made 
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an encompassing articulation of the so-called intervention dilemma. Rejecting 
arguments that relied too heavily on these forms of foundationalism, the 
argument was made that if one purports to avoid the stalemate these arguments 
induce, one has to place dialogical politics and the everyday context at the core of 
the analysis and make practical judgements accordingly. This does not lapse into 
relativism because the crucial notion of assessing questions on intervention is to 
ask questions on the power relations among different perspectives involved, 
including that of the researcher. 
 The argument set out by addressing the central tension among Liberal 
Peace critics Paris and Chandler. Rather than putting the reader on the wrong 
track, the first part placed both these arguments in their most enthralling and 
persuasive context in order to explicate the persistency of the intervention 
dilemma in the Liberal Peace framework. Not compromising for a trade-off 
between the positive and negative aspects of intervening or not, the thread that 
stitched together this part was the question of how this dichotomy could be 
overcome. This seamlessly segued into the inquiry on the deeper traditions of 
thought that underpinned this dichotomy. 
 In the second part, these traditions were presented in an according 
fashion: the cosmopolitan notion of a shared humanity and the communitarian 
objection to overcoming our communal boundaries once more explicated the 
entrenchment of the dilemma. In addition to a detailed understanding of these 
positions, the part debouched into an analysis of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples 
as a possible mitigation to bridge the gap. Through a reading of Williams’s work 
on Rawls however, the conclusion was drawn that Rawls’s attempt, rather than 
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succeeding at its endeavour of bridging the gap, impinged on one of the starkest 
formulations of the Catch 22 that is the intervention dilemma.  
 The third and final part was not intended as a deus ex machina but as an 
exercise in thinking differently by letting go of our foundationalist longing and 
start from where we are. Following a different strand of cosmopolitanism 
initiated by an inclusion of Richmond’s notion of a Post-Liberal Peace that starts 
from the everyday context, the idea of a dialogical politics was distilled as a 
challenge to the current dilemma. Through an engagement with Linklater and 
Shapcott, two tenors of ‘cosmopolitanism of a different kind’ and its implied 
dialogical politics, the part went on to the question what this all might mean in 
practical terms and so bring the argument back to the dilemma of intervention. 
The similarity between dialogical politics and a phronetic approach to social 
scientific research was thereby exposed as two sides of the same coin. They both 
concern taking where you are in the world as a designated starting point for an 
ongoing dialogue among all parties involved, including that of the researcher, as 
a fusion of horizons. Moreover, a phronetic turn might actually provoke 
dialogical politics. Its goal is to ask questions of where we are going and if this is 
desirable in order to make practical judgements. This turn to practice was 
eventually embraced as a welcome evolution in IR. Touching upon Brown’s 
recent work, a sketch was provided of what this new mode of thinking might 
imply. Finally, successful outcomes of this phronetic advancement were 
seriously questioned by elaborating on Flyvbjerg’s emphasis on taking into 
account the notion of power.  
 There nevertheless seems to be an impediment to this whole enterprise 
that might furrow the critical brow. Such a critical engagement might expose its 
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negligence in incorporating an explanatory case study as a significant 
shortcoming. Is a refusal to assess such examples not an obvious sign of aspired 
epistemic knowledge that is not rooted in a specific context but derived from 
abstract reasoning? The initial choice to exclude the English School argument 
from the analysis was founded on the presence of such aspirations in the 
arguments of Bull and Wheeler. In hindsight, we can argue that the tension 
between pluralists and solidarists in the English School is irreconcilable because 
they both aspire an epistemic approach to the intervention dilemma. Be that as it 
may, the question still stands: why is there no explicit engagement with the 
context of the everyday in the framework of a dialogue that includes the 
argument presented in this dissertation? Put differently, why is there no example 
of a phronetic assessment of humanitarian intervention? 
 An apparent disappointing objection to this claim might be to hold that 
doing so would have exceeded the scope of this dissertation. The central topic of 
this analysis was twofold: a bright articulation of the intervention dilemma that 
contemplates the possibility of transcending it. This is not quite the same as 
coming up with an elaborate and universal framework on intervention. As 
always, the devil is in the details because the possibility and desirability of such 
an attempt was severely challenged in the last part of this dissertation. More 
illuminating would be to explore how a phronetic approach to interventionism 
might be translated in the day-to-day praxis. It is here, and not in the present 
inquiry, that the necessity of including case studies is to be situated. The main 
purpose of this dissertation could therefore be summarised as an exercise of 
opening doors that are commonly held to be locked or even non-existent. 
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Opening the door of concrete case studies would be one of the thought-
provoking examples of future enquiry. 
Still, further research topics have interminable emerged since the 
introduction of phronesis to IR. Through the recent work of Brown, we can 
observe the seeping introduction of a new approach to the more pressing topics 
in IR, like humanitarian intervention, that place them in a brighter perspective. 
This is an aspirational yet vulnerable enterprise that requires continuous 
engagement in the future. By addressing Brown’s negligence of taking into 
consideration the notion of power, the exercise in balance this dissertation 
sought to place to the fore is explicated once more. Holding that there is no 
substitute for moral reasoning that involves making practical judgements, Brown 
rightly rejects any attempt to construct universal, epistemic frameworks. 
However, this endeavour risks slipping away into a relativistic resort to 
arbitrariness, selectivity, and even inconsistency. Only by asking questions 
through the scope of power, like who wins and who loses when an intervention 
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